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We present a simple and practical quantum protocol involving two mistrustful agencies in
Minkowski space, which allows Alice to transfer data to Bob at a spacetime location that nei-
ther can predict in advance. The location depends on both Alice’s and Bob’s actions. The protocol
guarantees unconditionally to Alice that Bob learns the data at a randomly determined location; it
guarantees to Bob that Alice will not learn the transfer location even after the protocol is complete.
The task implemented, transferring data at a space-time location that remains hidden from the
transferrer, has no precise analogue in non-relativistic quantum cryptography. It illustrates further
the scope for novel cryptographic applications of relativistic quantum theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Because quantum states cannot be cloned, and can be
entangled, someone who generates quantum states can
retain more information about them than another party
who receives them. Quantum cryptography exploits this
information control (and other features of quantum the-
ory) to implement interesting cryptographic tasks with
security guaranteed so long as quantum theory is correct.
The no-signalling principle of special relativity also al-
lows the controlled distribution of information, in the
sense that a party can transfer classical or quantum in-
formation secure in the knowledge that it can only be
communicated to the future light cone of the transfer
point. The important cryptographic task of mistrust-
ful coin tossing [1] can be implemented using this fact
alone. More surprisingly, it can also be used to imple-
ment the (strictly more powerful [2] ) task of bit com-
mitment, via protocols that require only classical infor-
mation exchanges but which guarantee security against
Mayers-Lo-Chau quantum attacks [3–7] as well as all clas-
sical attacks [9, 10].
We would like, for both theoretical and practical rea-
sons, to understand precisely which cryptographic tasks
can be implemented when we take relativistic quantum
theory to be the underlying theory, and thus combine
the information control techniques allowed by both the-
ories. There have been several interesting recent il-
lustrations [11, 12] of the cryptographic power of rel-
ativistic quantum theory. Work on quantum tagging
and position-based quantum cryptography has also pro-
duced new cryptographic schemes for quantum tagging
secure against technologically restricted adversaries [13–
16], some possible limits to the level of security attainable
for some versions of these tasks [15, 16] and an uncondi-
tionally secure protocol [17] for quantum tagging given
a tagging device that is cryptographically secure – i.e.
that can keep internal data secret from an adversary. In-
triguing extensions of quantum tagging to more general
position-based cryptographic tasks have also been devel-
oped [15].
Light speed constraints are already practically signifi-
cant in terrestrial technology, even on small scales, and
will become far more so as we and our technology mi-
grate further beyond the Earth. So it seems natural not
only to try to apply these constraints to implement clas-
sical (non-quantum non-relativistic) tasks, but also to re-
think what cryptography actually means – what the most
general interesting and potentially useful cryptographic
tasks are – in a world governed by relativity and quan-
tum theory. Although Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms,
and other efficient quantum algorithms for intrinsically
classical computational tasks, were seminal discoveries
which added great impetus to the development of quan-
tum computational theory, many believe that intrinsi-
cally quantum computational tasks may well ultimately
be the most significant applications of quantum comput-
ing. It seems by now quite plausible too that intrinsically
relativistic and quantum cryptographic tasks will also ul-
timately be among the most significant applications of
physics-based cryptography and computing. At the very
least, it seems worth exploring what might be possible
with this vision in mind.
In this paper we define a new and intrinsically rela-
tivistic cryptographic task, data transfer at a spacetime
location that remains hidden from the transferring party.
We give a simple and practical protocol for implement-
ing this task, and show the protocol is unconditionally
secure, in an appropriately defined sense. The protocol
is inspired by the no-summoning theorem [18] and its
application to bit commitment [12]. Roughly speaking,
the underlying intuition is that, by producing one qu-
dit of an entangled pair at an unpredictable point, Alice
effectively constrains Bob, who has no way of ensuring
that he can produce the other qudit at or near the same
point. However, the security proof goes beyond the no-
summoning theorem, using other features of relativistic
quantum theory. In particular, it implicitly assumes that
the unitary evolution of quantum states between any two
spacelike hypersurfaces can be covariantly defined, as in
the Tomonaga-Schwinger formalism [19, 20].
2II. TRANSFERRING DATA WITH
ENTANGLED FLYING QUDITS
We give an idealized version of the protocol here to
simplify the presentation.1 We suppose that space-time
is Minkowski and that nature is described by some ap-
propriate relativistic version of quantum theory. We con-
sider two agencies, Alice and Bob, with representatives
at all the relevant points in space-time, and suppose that
both have arbitrarily efficient technology, limited only by
physical principles, and that all their operations and com-
munications are error-free. We also suppose they agree in
advance on some space-time point P , where the protocol
commences, and on a fixed inertial reference frame.
We suppose they are also independently able to ac-
cess suitable points Qi (where i runs from 0 to m − 1)
in the causal future of P , and that each is able to keep
information everywhere secure from the other unless and
until they choose to disclose it. We also suppose that
Alice and Bob can independently and securely access all
the points P and Qi and instantaneously exchange in-
formation there. In particular, Alice can keep a bipar-
tite entangled state private somewhere in the past of P
and arrange to transfer one subsystem to Bob at P , and
Alice’s and Bob’s subsystems can then be kept private
unless and until they choose to transfer them at some
point(s) in the future of P . We also suppose that both
parties can send any relevant states at light speed in pre-
scribed directions along secure quantum channels.
Apart from our idealized assumptions about indepen-
dent access to suitable space-time points, we are following
here the standard conventions of mistrustful cryptogra-
phy. Alice and Bob mistrust one another, and each trusts
only operations they carry out themselves in their own
secure “laboratories”. As is standard in mistrustful cryp-
tography, the aim of our protocol is to offer each some
guaranteed control over the information obtained by the
other, despite their mistrust. We need not consider the
actions of any third parties (for instance an interfering
eavesdropper Eve), since as far as Alice is concerned ev-
erything outside her laboratory is potentially under Bob’s
control, and vice versa.
We focus here on a specific version of the protocol,
with m = 2: the protocol can obviously be extended to
larger m, to various geometries, and to variants involv-
ing multipartite entanglement. For m = 2, Alice and
Bob agree two distinct spatial directions v0 and v1 in the
agreed frame. For simplicity, we focus here on one natu-
ral choice, in which the vi are opposite; we set c = 1, take
P to be the origin and the two spatial directions to be de-
1 As in other applications [12] inspired by the no-summoning the-
orem [18], these unphysical idealizations can be relaxed without
affecting the essential idea, and it is easy to adjust the protocol
so that it can be securely implemented under realistic physical
assumptions, allowing for noise and time lags. See Refs. [12, 18]
for illustrations.
fined by the vectors v0 = (−1, 0, 0, 0) and v1 = (1, 0, 0, 0)
in the fixed frame coordinates (x, y, z, t).
Before the protocol, Alice generates a two qudit state;
the dimension d is a pre-agreed parameter. This state de-
termines the datum that will be transferred in the pro-
tocol. If the protocol is followed, Bob will receive an
integer in the range 1, . . . , d2. Suppose for the moment
that Alice wishes this integer to be classically determined
from the start of the protocol. She then prepares a max-
imally entangled state ψi ∈ C
d
A ⊗ C
d
B, chosen from a pre-
agreed orthonormal basis labelled by i = 1, . . . , d2. This
is encoded in two physical subsystems which (idealizing
again) we take to be pointlike. She keeps the state pri-
vate until P , where she gives the second subsystem to
Bob. Alice now uses a private equiprobable random bit
j ∈ {0, 1} and sends the first subsystem along a secure
channel that she controls at light speed in the direction
vj , i.e. along the line L0 = {(−t, 0, 0, t), t > 0} (for j = 0)
or the line L1 = {(t, 0, 0, t), t > 0} (for j = 1).
2
Bob is free to act as he wishes, depending on his pre-
ferred distribution for the point of data transfer. If he
wishes to maximize his chance of obtaining the data at
the earliest3 possible point in space-time, then he also
randomly chooses a bit k ∈ {0, 1} by flipping a fair coin
and sends the second subsystem along a secure channel
that he controls at light speed in the direction vk.
To transfer the datum to Bob, Alice gives him the sec-
ond subsystem at some point Qj along the line Lj . The
points Q0 and Q1 (but not Alice’s choice j) could be
agreed in advance, in which case Bob knows to expect
the data at one of two possible points. However, if Alice
wishes to retain freedom in choosing the transfer point,
she can choose any point Qj along Lj , provided that Bob
is prepared to receive data there. To simplify here, we as-
sume Q0 = {−T, 0, 0, T } and Q1 = {T, 0, 0, T } are fixed,
for some agreed choice of T .
The transferred datum is the value of i. To obtain this
information, Bob needs to carry out a measurement of
the two subsystems in the agreed orthonormal basis. His
measurement need not necessarily be local; however, if
not, then Bob will possess the datum i only at points
where he is able to combine all the data obtained from
non-local measurement operations.
A. Security against Alice
Alice has little scope for cheating. She can choose the
joint state of the two subsystems to be a state other than
one of the basis states ψi. If she does, Bob will ultimately
2 By requiring light speed transmission in opposite directions we
ensure the possible data transfer points separate as fast as possi-
ble in the given frame. Neither constraint is necessary, however:
the protocol achieves location-oblivious data transfer so long as
Q0 and Q1 are spacelike separated.
3 With respect to the Minkowski causal partial ordering.
3obtain an i corresponding to the random outcome of his
measurement. Nonetheless, Bob obtains a value of i. The
aim of this protocol is simply to ensure that Alice trans-
fers some datum to Bob: as with classical oblivious trans-
fer [8], there is no requirement that the datum transferred
should be “correct” by any external standard. Nor do we
require that the datum be classically determined before
the protocol is complete – something which is not possible
with any intrinsically quantum protocol (see e.g. [21]).
Alice’s freedom in choosing the joint state thus does not
constitute cheating.
Alice’s only other freedom is to choose j by some pro-
cedure other than flipping a fair coin. This gives her no
advantage, assuming – as we will here – that Alice and
Bob each assign equal utility to Bob knowing the datum
at points (x, y, z, t) and (−x, y, z, t), for any coordinate
values.4
Moreover, given this symmetry of utilities, it can only
help Bob if Alice deviates from unbiased randomness:
if he learns some information about Alice’s strategy for
choosing j he may alter his own strategy in response, and
thus increase the chance that the datum is transferred to
him earlier. We need not consider this possibility, since
it involves both parties violating the protocol5, but in
any case there is no motivation for Alice to pursue this
strategy.
B. Security against Bob
Bob may act as he wishes, constrained only by the
laws of quantum theory and relativity. By definition,
he cannot cheat. Interestingly, though, he is nonetheless
quite constrained. We say Bob learns6 the correct value
of i if he obtains it by some strategy which (in the ideal
error-free case) guarantees that, if it produces an answer
i′ and Alice chose a classically pre-determined i, then
i = i′.
Suppose first that he follows the strategy above, send-
ing his qudit in a randomly chosen direction vk (k = 0
or 1), and suppose without loss of generality that k = 0.
He then learns the value of j at Q0, where he either re-
ceives the second qudit (j = 0) or does not (j = 1); he
similarly learns this value at Q1. If j = 0, he can obtain
the datum i at Q0, by carrying out a local measurement
on both qudits there. If j = 1, he now has the two qu-
dits at spacelike separated locations, Q0 and Q1, and is
aware of the situation at both locations. For any point
X , we write L(X) for the set containing X and its future
4 If their utilities are asymmetric, things become more compli-
cated, and we need game theory to determine Alice’s and Bob’s
optimal actions.
5 As usual in mistrustful cryptography, the aim is to protect an
honest party against a cheat; we do not aim to protect cheats
against the consequences of their own misbehaviour.
6 I.e. comes to know with certainty.
light cone. Bob can obtain the datum i at any point Y in
the intersection L(Q0)∩L(Q1) by sending the two qudits
from Q0 and Q1 to Y .
7 And this is the best Bob can do
when he holds the two entangled qudits at Q0 and Q1:
he cannot then learn the datum i at any location outside
L(Q0) ∩ L(Q1).
In summary, following this strategy, with probability 1
2
he learns i at Qj, and with probability
1
2
he learns i only
at Y . Note that Alice never learns k, and so does not
know the location at which Bob learns i, since all Bob’s
operations are private.
In fact, the above strategy is optimal for Bob, in the
following sense: (i) Bob has no strategy that gives him
probability greater than 0 of learning i at any point out-
side L(Qj), and (ii) Bob has no strategy that gives him
probability greater than 1
2
of learning i at any point out-
side L(Q0) ∩ L(Q1).
To see (i), we simply observe that Bob has no access
to the subsystem defined by CdA until Alice transfers it at
Qj.
To see (ii), consider a spacelike hypersurface S close
to and in the past of the boundary of L(Q0) ∪ L(Q1).
For simplicity, take S to be symmetric under reflec-
tions in the x-coordinate, and define the subsurfaces
S0 = {(x, y, z, t) ∈ S : x ≤ 0} and S1 = {(x, y, z, t) ∈
S : x ≥ 0}.
Without loss of generality, we can consider Bob’s ac-
tions between P and S as defined by a unitary operation
acting on CdB together perhaps with ancillary states, gen-
erating some quantum state on S. Hence at least one of
the states defined by the restriction of this state to S0 or
S1 must be entangled with the C
d
A state held by Alice.
As Bob does not know j until after the points Q0 and
Q1, his actions up to S are independent of the choice of
j. Hence, with probability ≥ 1
2
, Bob generates a state on
Sj¯ – the opposite half of the hypersurface to Qj – that is
entangled with the state transferred by Alice at Qj . Bob
thus cannot learn the outcome of the desired measure-
ment at any point not in the intersection of the future
light cone of Qj and the future light cone of at least one
point in Sj¯ . As we can find spacelike S arbitrarily close
to the boundary of L(Q0) ∪ L(Q1), the result follows.
III. DISCUSSION
The task defined here, transferring data at a location
that remains hidden from the transferrer, has no precise
analogue in classical or non-relativistic quantum cryptog-
raphy, although it bears some resemblance to classical
oblivious transfer [8]. Like classical oblivious transfer,
7 He could also achieve this by a variety of other strategies, for
example by using a second predistributed entangled pair of qudits
to carry out a nonlocal measurement at Q0 and Q1 and sending
the results to Y .
4it is probably not very useful in itself, but could be a
building block for much more useful tasks (as oblivious
transfer is [22]).
In any case, it illustrates some interesting possibilities
in relativity-based cryptography. First, one can aim to
control where exactly in spacetime various parties learn
information as a result of a protocol. In our protocol
this control is randomized; it would also be interesting
to explore the (im)possibility of deterministic location
control. Second, the locations at which information is
learned themselves constitute information generated by
the protocol, and the flow of this information is also con-
trolled. Moreover, this control can be asymmetric – in
our protocol, Bob learns the location information, and
Alice never does.
These possibilities raise some intriguing questions. For
example, one can imagine secure multi-party computa-
tion [23] scenarios in which parties are supposed to learn
some outputs given by prescribed joint functions of the
inputs, but it does not matter that various parties even-
tually learn partial or even complete data about other
parties’ input data, as long as there are strong enough
constraints on where in spacetime they learn this. It
would be very interesting to understand whether, and
under what conditions, such constraints can be imple-
mented securely.
Our protocol imposes strong constraints on Bob what-
ever it does. However, it should be stressed that he has
more general possibilities than those highlighted above, if
he is willing to accept some risk that he will never obtain
the correct value of Alice’s input datum. For example, he
could carry out some form of partial cloning on his qudit
and send the two outputs to Q0 and Q1 respectively, and
then obtain some information about i by a local mea-
surement at Qj, whichever j Alice chooses. It would be
interesting to characterize the tradeoffs available to Bob
via his most general strategies.
Finally, one might perhaps wonder whether the proto-
col is intrinsically quantum, or whether it could perhaps
be implemented classically. For example, could Alice ini-
tially give Bob a classical bit b0 at P , and a second bit
b1 at one of the Qi, in order to transfer the bit sum
b = b0 ⊕ b1? A little thought shows this does not re-
strict Bob, since once he receives b0 he can simply broad-
cast it in all directions, ensuring that he obtains b at
whichever point Alice chooses to return b1. More gener-
ally, since the security proof relies on the no-summoning
theorem, which holds in relativistic quantum theory but
not in relativistic classical theories, no classical protocol
can achieve the same result.
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